In the last few years, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have emerged as a disrupting technology for myriad military and civilian applications. They demand an accurate location of the event detected and is done by using a mobile beacon node to provide accurate location and assume a benign environment. However, in a hostile military environment, such a node can be easily tampered by an adversary. In this paper, we propose a distributed cluster based anomaly detection scheme by assigning few randomly chosen cluster heads a critical task of estimating the reliability of the mobile beacon node. As localization of remaining nodes is cautiously performed only after verifying the authenticity of the mobile beacon node, a considerable overhead is saved in the incorrect localization of the entire network. We perform extensive simulation for different attacks and observe our scheme to have a high detection rate of 99% and a very lessfalse positive rate of20 %. Another important benefit of employing mobile sensor is for sensor localization. The problem of determining the location of sensors is called localization problem. It can be performed by using special nodes equipped with GPS called "beacon nodes" as references. Many Localization schemes proposed in the past can be classified into two main categories based on whether static Beacon nodes or a "Mobile Beacon" (MB) node is used. In this Paper, we consider the WSN using a Single MB node for Localization [6] . The MB node broadcasts its beacon messages as it traverses through the network along a pre-determined or a random path. In the beacon messages location information is carried, so that other static sensors hearing can estimate their own location with reference to the coordinates of the mobile beacon messages.
INTRODUCTION
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a highly distributed network of a large number of wireless sensors. Recent works in WSNs have demonstrated an enhancement in the coverage and lifetime of the WSN by employing mobile sensors. One or more sensors can be configured with mobility as needed by the underlying application and the optimization could be done either in terms of the lifetime or coverage of the network. A scattered group of mobile sensors used for deployment have a unique ability to self-deploy [1] , i.e., move from random configuration to uncovered holes such that the network coverage is maximized. Also, the lifetime of static sensors [2] can be improved by using a single or multiple mobile nodes as they can directly collects data from the static sensors by single hop and transmits it to the Sink.
Another important benefit of employing mobile sensor is for sensor localization. The problem of determining the location of sensors is called localization problem. It can be performed by using special nodes equipped with GPS called "beacon nodes" as references. Many Localization schemes proposed in the past can be classified into two main categories based on whether static Beacon nodes or a "Mobile Beacon" (MB) node is used. In this Paper, we consider the WSN using a Single MB node for Localization [6] . The MB node broadcasts its beacon messages as it traverses through the network along a pre-determined or a random path. In the beacon messages location information is carried, so that other static sensors hearing can estimate their own location with reference to the coordinates of the mobile beacon messages.
Authentication mechanism given in [2] is limited to establishing a secure communication channel and preventing rogue nodes from joining the network. However, the deployment of sensors in hostile terrains makes them physically accessible and vulnerable to malicious attackers. Thus, the authentication mechanism alone is incapable of protecting the MB node from being physically compromised. A malicious attacker can capture sensitive key information; tamper the GPS of MB node to send incorrect location to the static sensors. If the compromised MB node sends a wrong location, all the sensors get incorrectly localized. For example, in a critical military operation such as battle surveillance, an incorrectly localized sensor could flag an enemy's zone as a safe zone. Thus, it is very critical to enforce a localization anomaly detection scheme that would detect a compromised MB node and is different from a WSN using multiple static beacon nodes. Localization in the former case is primarily done by single MB node and hence performing anomaly detection after the complete localization of the network results in intolerable delays. Also, as the beacon node is mobile, the beacons sent by the MB node have to be continuously validated.
In this paper, we propose a novel cluster based anomaly detection scheme to detect the compromised MB node that causes localization errors. Most of the anomaly detection schemes proposed in the literature [4] [5] are with multiple static beacon nodes. In these schemes, as the static beacon nodes are uniformly deployed, the entire network is first localized and then each beacon node validates [5] the correctness of the beacon messages of the other beacon nodes using their location information and anomaly detection metrics [4] . This kind of detection results in energy consumption of each node and wrong localization of the entire network. In case of WSN using a MB node for localization, the MB node localizes the network in a sequential fashion along its moving path. Therefore, we perform concurrent localization and anomaly detection and reduce the latency of attack detection by using an efficient cluster based mechanism. While our proposed solution is based on some of the ideas presented in [3] , the underlying goal and the process are totally different. To the best of our knowledge, no other localization anomaly detection scheme has been previously investigated to detect the compromised MB node in a WSN.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related work. Section 3 presents the system model, the security aspects and the design goals of the proposed anomaly detection scheme. Section 4 presents the architecture of our localization anomaly detector module. Section 5 illustrates the effectiveness of our proposed scheme through extensive simulations. We finally conclude the paper and present the future work in Section 6.
2.
RELATED WORK Though there are several schemes for localization in a WSN, the problem of localization anomaly detection in WSN using a MB node has been largely neglected. Localization by using a MB node than multiple static Beacon nodes offers many benefits like reduces the cost of using multiple GPS receivers, helps to localize the entire network without leaving few nodes uncovered.
Most of the localization schemes for WSN employ a distributed approach where each node computes its location based on the received beacon information. Further these schemes are classified along two dimensions as range based vs. range free schemes depending upon whether they use signal strength, distance or angle estimates in location calculations or they depend only on the contents of received messages. The range based schemes such as Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) [5] , Time of Arrival (TOA) [6] developed for WSN with static sensors and single MB node utilizes range information to estimate the distance. Each sensor using the scheme in [6] uses the estimated distance in the Bayesian rule to determine its location. The sensors using [7] apply the centroidal formula with distance information to estimate their coordinates. Another range based approach discussed in [7] , used in WSN with static beacon nodes and mobile sensors uses triangulation method on the measured range estimates for location estimation. Range free methods, such as [8] and [9] used in WSN with multiple MB nodes use radio connectivity constraints to bound sensor location within the transmission area of MB node for each received beacon to determine its exact location. In Monte Carlo Localization [10] , the sensors estimate their location based on their motion and perception with reference to the MB nodes.
Owing to the hostile environment in which sensors are deployed, all localization schemes are prone to be compromised. In the past few years, few schemes have been proposed to detect such localization anomalies. They are primarily based on the principle of anomaly based detection, which classifies any significant deviation from the established normal behaviors as an attack. Echo protocol [11] uses radio frequency and ultra sound to verify the location information broadcasted by a MB node. But, this scheme verifies the region of the sensor and not the exact location. Du et al. [3] propose an operational model of anomaly detection based on certain threshold metrics which reflects the deviations between the observed set of neighbors computed by applying the localization scheme and the known set of neighbors derived from a node's deployment knowledge. Liu et al. [4] propose to detect malicious beacons in the network using redundant information available from other near by beacon nodes. Each beacon node uses multiple non-beacon IDs, called detecting IDs, as a mask to perform validation check using the threshold metrics on other beacon's broadcasted location information. However, such a scheme is inapplicable to a WSN where the entire network is primarily localized based on a single MB node. It is a challenging task to detect malicious mobile beacon in a WSN due to dynamic nature of the MB node. We employ the deployment knowledge based anomaly detection module based on a difference metric [4] . However, this scheme incurs considerable latency in detecting the attack as detection is performed only after the entire network is localized. Therefore, we focus on concurrent localization and detection using randomly chosen CHs.
3.
SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS In this section, we provide details about the network deployment model, localization model and the security model of the system considered for the analysis of our scheme. We also enlist the design goals of the proposed anomaly detector.
Network Deployment Model
We assume a WSN consisting of a Single MB node and thousands of Static sensors to be deployed in a hostile environment. Uniform coverage of the entire region is ensured by dividing the area into small square regions and considering the deployment points as the centre point of each square grid as shown in Figure 1 . All sensors lying inside one region collectively form a group and are assigned a unique sensor ID, group ID and are also preloaded with the deployment point information. The sensors are deployed from a low flying airplane or unmanned Arial/ground vehicle around the deployment points such that their final resident point follows a Gaussian distribution in each square region ( Figure 1 ). We consider a MB node equipped with GPS receiver traversing through out the network along a semideterministic path as shown in Figure 2 , with the speed V rn/sec and broadcasting location information as beacons at regular intervals of time, i.e., every t sec. This mobility path ensures that each sensor receives more than three non collinear beacon messages. As shown in Figure 2 , the sensor 'P' is able to receive five beacons at different instances. Each sensor follows the procedure in section 3.2 to estimate their location. We focus on the above specific sensor deployment strategy because it is the mostly widely used [4] . Also, our detection scheme is not affected by the deployment model of sensors and mobility model of the MB node as the sensors will have the deployment knowledge. Our scheme can be easily extended to the case of a WSN with Multiple MB nodes with some modifications. For example, each MB node can be detected separately by using the proposed scheme. 4.
DCLAD SCHEME
In this section, we describe various stages in the proposed Distributed Cluster Based Localization Anomaly Detection (DCLAD) scheme which can simultaneously perform localization and anomaly detection. The first stage is the Localization Phase where the sensors in the transmission range of MB node localize using RSSI based localization scheme. It is subsequently followed by Cluster Head (CH) Election Phase. All sensors which had already localized form clusters and elect a CH. After this phase, the elected CHs enter into Anomaly Detection Phase to determine the reliability of MB node and report the information to the BS. The last stage is the Backend Calculations where the BS parses the report gathered from few sensors in every grid and raises timely alarm when a compromised MB node is detected. Other sensor nodes check whether such an alarm signal is raised by the BS and if so, they stop the process of localization. A detailed discussion about the various stages is given below.
STAGE I: Localization Phase
The MB node moves through the network and it broadcasts its location beacons at each broadcast instant. All sensors which are in the transmission range of the MB node hear this beacon and calculate their location information using the scheme described in section 3.2. STAGE II: Cluster Head Election Phase As sensors are energy constrained devices, we try to save their energy by employing cluster based detection.
Though multiple sensors listen to the beacon of MB node, we delegate the job of monitoring the MB node to few sensors only. We elect only few sensors as leaders, in order to save the energy in anomaly detection and reduce the communication overhead in submitting report to the BS 0. Unlike the mobile cluster formation discussed in 0, we use a static and distributed Hash Based Cluster Head election approach [15] for detection where few sensors in the transmission range of the MB node are elected as CHs. Clustering is repeated at regular intervals of time called the "clustering instants" or CI which is different from broadcasting instants. The CI should be carefully chosen to ensure that all the sensors involved in clustering would have received enough beacon messages to compute their location before involving in detection. For our analysis, we have chosen three CI in each square region. Larger value of CI, i.e., the number of CHs elected in the network, increases the energy consumption. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the accuracy and energy.
At each CI, all sensors which are in the transmission range of the MB node and have received at least three noncollinear beacon messages will be involved in clustering and we refer to such sensors as member sensors. Clustering is performed such that all sensors in the 1-hop of vicinity of each other form a cluster group Gj. We restrict to a 1-hop neighborhood. Hence, multiple cluster groups are formed at each clustering instant. This ensures that every node is a member of a cluster. The chosen CH, in each group then runs the anomaly detection algorithm and reports any anomaly to the Base Station.
At (R1, R2,. ...,R11) mod n ), where n is the number of members in each group G., and is the ID of the sensor to be chosen as CH. In order to avoid the possibility of a malicious electing itself as a CH, and misreporting the anomaly information, we randomly choose the CH. As the possibility of a malicious sensor elected as a CH is meager among a group of sensors, we take this chance. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the security and the efficiency. STAGE III: Anomaly Detection Phase
In stage III, the process of continuously monitoring the behavior of MB node is implemented. If the MB node broadcasts wrong information, the CH will be able detect it by using the deployed neighborhood knowledge and the estimated location and uses this information to maintain the reliability of the MB node. Initially, all the sensors broadcast their group IDs to each other as a part of HELLO messages. Then the elected CHs use these received HELLO messages to derive N(observed) , the number of sensors from each neighboring group. Each CH employs a localization algorithm to compute its location. As all sensors are pre-deployed with deployment point information, each sensor is capable of determining its probability of being in the neighborhood of another sensor. Thus, the elected CHs now derive a new observation vector N(Calculated), the number of sensors from each neighboring group using their estimated location and deployment knowledge. They then compare it with the initial set of neighbors to compute the Difference Metric [4] DiffMetric = N(Observed) -N(Calculated) DiffMetric indicates the extent to which the estimated location is different from the actual location. This is used to trigger an alarm based on a certain threshold th, which reflects the amount of location error that can be tolerated in a network, i.e., the acceptable difference between the number of observed neighbors and calculated neighbors. The CH updates a flag called the Reliability Index (RI) to indicate the behavior of the MB node. The RI value is set as follows:
If(DiffMetric > th) RI = 1 else RI = 0
The value of '1' indicates that the location is far from its actual location and hence the sensor has computed a wrong location. The wrong location can be due to the incorrect beacon messages from the MB node or due to the sensor compromise. We deal with both the cases in our scheme. '0' indicates vice versa. It then submits this value to the BS. In a similar fashion, all CHs in every region send their RI values to the BS. The transmission of a single bit RI value results in very less energy consumption at each CH and also very less overhead at the BS.
STAGE IV: Backend Calculations at the Base Station
The BS obtains the knowledge on the MB node behavior through the RI values submitted by the CHs. At each clustering instant, CHs belonging to different group submit multiple RI values to the BS. Figure 3 Figure 3 . Parsing by Base Station If majority (> 50%) of CHs indicates that the MB node is compromised, they assign a value of '1' for the RI value of the MB node at that instant and '0' otherwise. Likewise, it determines the RI values at all the clustering instants in a particular grid and then determines the overall behavior of the MB node in that grid from this information. If the MB node broadcasts wrong location for most of the time in a grid, i.e., Two out of three CHs report the RI value as '1', then the BS considers the MB node as malicious in that grid. Thus, after observing the behavior of MB node in few grids till the "Aggregation instant" or AI, the BS checks if the MB node is behaving maliciously in this time span and correspondingly raises an alarm. All sensors which have not yet performed localization, now stops localization and save valuable network resources. The RI values submitted by the CHs are a useful indicator of localized error as it clearly demarks the grid in which MB node performed incorrect localization. Thus, rather than re-localizing the entire network, corrective action can be restricted to that particular grid. The 'AI' or the time for which MB node behavior is observed affects the accuracy of detection. But increasing 'AI' increases the number of CHs. Thus there is a tradeoff between the accuracy, the energy consumption, and the detection latency.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the performance of our proposed cluster based localization anomaly detection scheme using simulations in MATLAB. We consider an area of 500 x 500 square meters (sq. m) divided into 25 square regions, each of area 10000 sq. m. The network density is taken as 1250 nodes with 50 nodes in each group. The detection threshold th for the difference metric DiffMetric is taken as 10. The speed of the MS is taken as 1 Om/s. The location broadcast interval by the mobile sink is taken as 1 sec, i.e., it travels 1Om, broadcasts the location information. Clustering Intervals are taken after every 8th broadcast instants, i.e., the clustering instants are taken at 9th, 17th, 25th broadcast instants. We consider 3
Clustering instants in each grid and 27 broadcast instants of MB node in each grid. 
Simulation Results
We illustrate the performance of our scheme and analyze the effect of different parameters on the performance metrics in this section. Figure 4 demonstrates the detection ability of our system for different attack cases as the number of compromised sensors is increased. % of compromised sensor nodes Figure 4 . TPR vs. % of compromised sensor nodes We can see that our scheme is able to detect most of the attack patterns followed by the MB node with an accuracy of 97%. The TPR decreases as the number of Compromised sensors in the network is increased because the probability of a compromised sensor being elected as CH might increase. The 'AI' is taken as 1 8th instant by the BS. Similarly, Figure 5 shows the FPR for varying number of compromised sensors. It can be seen that the maximum value of FPR is within 30%, for a largely compromised network with 50% compromised sensors. We also note that when compared to other attacks the detection rate of attack 5 is less and its False alarm rate is more. This is because the BS is not able to observe the total symmetric attack pattern until the 18th instant. Thus 'AI' affects the accuracy of detection depending upon whether more or less number of RI values is available to the BS. We study the effect of 'AI' on the accuracy of our algorithm. We see from Figure 6 that Attack 5 takes more time to be detected when the aggregation is at l8th instant.
It also shows that the performance is better if the 'AI' is taken at 36th instant, i.e., the BS will have more sample RI values to detect the behavior. Also increasing 'Al' increases the detection time. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the accuracy and detection latency and energy consumption of the sensors. We, however, observe similar performance for other kinds of attacks (at 18th and 36th instant) which are relatively easier to detect. We next study the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve (TPR vs. FPR) which reflects the tradeoffs in the sensitivity of the detection algorithm. Figure 7 shows the ROC curve for Attack 4 using our detection scheme with aggregation point at 18th instant. We observe that using our scheme very less number of times a correct beacon message of MB node is reported as incorrect by the CHs (as seen by 0 FPR value) and all compromised instances of the MB node are correctly reported by the CHs (as seen by the high TPR value close to 1). Similar kind of low FPR vs. high TPR behavior is observed for the detection of remaining attacks using our scheme. Due to lack of space, we refrain from presenting these results. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a cluster based localization anomaly detection module for detecting malicious MB node in a WSN. In a WSN, as localization is performed by a single MB node, it is very time consuming to perform detection after the localization of the whole network. Hence, we propose an efficient cluster based mechanism to perform localized detection and correction at the earliest in a concurrent fashion. Each CH estimates the reliability of the MB node and submits its feedback to the BS. The BS parses the gathered RI values and detects the malicious behavior of MB node. The BS observes the reliability reports from sensors for a considerable amount of time before raising an alarm to avoid the effect of compromised sensors. The random election of CH results in the design of a secure and energy efficient detection scheme. Our cluster based anomaly detection scheme has a high detection rate and a low false positive rate. As a part of our future work, we plan to detect not only localization errors but also determine deviations in the movements of a MB node that can result in imbalance of energy and disruption of sleep schedule among the sensor nodes.
